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Abstract
In the Netherlands, students who want to become a medical specialist
have to enrol in a training program which is in limited supply. During
the search for a position as trainee (or "junior medical specialist"),
they may accept a temporary job as a medical assistant. We use a
micro dataset to investigate whether such work experience increases
the probability of becomingjunior medical specialist. To deal with ae-
lectivity, we simultaneously model the transitions from unemployment
to trainee, from unemployment to medical assistant, from medical as-
sistant to trainee and from medical assistant to unemployment. We
find that work experience helps to become a medical specialist.
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11 Introduction
Since the late 1970s, the econometric analysis of duration variables has be-
come widespread. In the case of unemployment durations, the instantaneous
probability of a transition from unemployment to employment is estimated
as a function of individual characteristics as well as the elapsed duration it-
self (see Lancaster, 1990, Devine and Kiefer, 1991, and Van den Berg, 1999,
for surveys). Some recent studies focus on the effects of training and other
labor market programs. To estimate such an effect, one has to deal with the
possibility that eruolment. into the program is selective. In the case of non-
experimental data, a solution to this problem is to model bot}t the process
by which unemployed enter the program and the process by which they en-
ter employment (see Gritz, 1993, Bonnal, Fougère and Séra.ndon, 1997, and
Abbring, Va,n den Berg azid Van Ours, 1997, for examples).
This paper analyzes part.iculaa aspects of the medical education system
in the Netherlands, using t.echniques sitnilar to those in the literature on
the effect of training on unemployment duration. The medical education sys-
tem consists of two successive stages, and, as we sha11 see below, we focus
on the duration between these two stages. The first stage is an extended
undergraduate program. Upon completion of this, the individual obtains a
degree comparable to a Master's degree. The official title of this degree is
basic doctor. A basic doctor who decides to leave t.he educational system is
only allowed t.o work in a limited range of inedical jobs. For example, he is
not allowed t,o work as a physician or as a surgeon. He is however allowed to
work as a n~edical assistant: in such jobs, the individual assists medical spe-
cialists, but he does not receive any deliberate training or further education.
Work experience as a medical assistant. does not, result in any qualification
or degree. However, as we shall see below, it may facilitate the inflow into
t.he second stage of the medical educational system.
The second st.age ofthe system concerns the education to become surgeon,
gynecologist, physician (family cíoctor), etc. This educat.ion is provided in
trainee posit.ions in which the incíividual is supervised by medical specialists
for a number of ,years. We refer to an individual in such a position as a
jv.nior tnediail specialist.~ Formally, these positions are temporary jobs. The
i The literal translations ofthe Dutch tenns used to denote medical assistants and junior
medical specialists are: "assistant in medical science not in education" and "assistant in
medical science in education", respectively (the corresponding acronyms are AGNIO and
2individuals perform regular work and they receive a salary. The number of
these positions is limited by the government and by communities of existing
medical specialists, and the demand usually exceeds the supply by far. In
order to become a junior medical specialist, one generally has to apply for
a position, and the application procedure resembles that for standard job
applications. For sake of convenience, we refer to t.he institutions that decide
on the applications as the employers. After completion of the second stage,
the individual is a medicnl specialist.
We aze interested in the determinants of the rate at which individuals
become a junior medical specialist, or, equivalently, the duration of seazch
for a position as junior medical specialist. In particular, we examine whether
work experience as a medical assistant increases the individual transition
rate to junior medical specialist jobs. At first sight it may seem unlikely that
there exists any work experience at all that is valuable as a preparation of
junior medical specialist jobs, given that junior medical specialists acquire
expert knowledge that enables them to decide on matters of life and death
on a regular basis, whereas basic doctors do not. However, working as a
medical specialist involves many other skills, including diagnostic testing and
social skills, and these may be learned to some extent in medical assistant
jobs. Thus, medical assistant jobs may allow the individual to acquire some
additional human capit.al.
There are at least two other reasons for why an employer may prefer to
hire workers who have worked in medical assistant jobs. First, having had
such a job may be informative on the ability and interests of the individual.
The employer of the medical assistant job decided t.hat the individual was
qualified for that job, and, by having accepted the job, the individual signals
that he is interested in a medical career. The employers of the junior medical
specialist jobs may then use medical assistant jobs as a screening or signalling
device. This may sort individuals with work experience into junior medical
specialist jobs (see Weiss, 1995, for a recent overview of t.he underlying theory
of sorting.) Yet. another explanation for an effect of work experience is that
the lat.ter enlarges the social network of the individual within the medical
world, and this may make it. easier for an employer to estimate the quality
of the individual as a junior medical specialist.
If work experience has a positive effect, then it is interesting to examine
AGIO). These terms were adopted in the 1980s because of their resemblance to the term
"assistant in education" (acronym AIO) which is generally used to denote PhD students.
3whether the size of the effect depends on the amount. of work experience. If
work experience as a medical assistant increases human capital or enlarges
the relevant social network then the effect should increase with the amount of
experience. If the presence of any work experience acts as a signalling device
then it is less obvious that the effect depends on the amount of experience.
Employers may aLso use the dumtion of a medical assistant job and the
length of time since graduation as a basic doctor as screening devices. In
the former case, a job with a long duration signals satisfaction of the firm
at which the individual works, so the expected effect of the duration of the
medical assistant job is positive, and this may explain any positive duration
dependence of the transition rate from medical assistant to junior medical
specialist. In the latter case, individuals with a high elapsed duration since
graduation as a basic doctor may become stigmatized, and this decreases
their inflow rat.e into junior medical specialist jobs. This is basically the
standard argument for negative duration dependence of the transition rate
from unemployment to employment. If the model does not contain the elapsed
duration since graduation as a basic doctor as an explanatory variable for
the transition rate from medical assistant to junior medical specialist then
this shows up as negative duration dependence of this transition rate.
The chances to become a junior medical specialist may be related to
the yeaz in which the student became basic doctor, e.g. because the size of
the infíowing cohort varies over the years or because the number of junior
medical specialist. jobs vazies. The chances may also depend on the university
at which he graduated. Finally, personal characteristics of the student, like
age, gender, and duration of undergraduate study, may be important. All
these characteristics may also interact with the size of the effect of having a
medical assistant job on the chancess to become a junior medical specialist.
For example, the effect of having a medica] assistant. job may be smaller
for students from a particular utvversity if the curriculum of that university
includes a lot of work experience during the education. The data do not
enable an assessment of the effect of wages on the transitions, but this is not
a serious omission as there is almost no variation in wages across medical
assistant jobs and across junior medical specialist jobs.
Our data aze from a 1990 survey in which individuals who became basic
doctor in 1984, 1986, and 1988, were asked about their labor market history,
including any transitions into and out of inedical assistant jobs and junior
medical specialist jobs. We use these data to estimate a multi-state multi-
4spell duration model. We distinguish between the states of unemployment
(which includes having a job outside of the medical sector), having a medical
assistant job, and having a junior medical specialist position. The transition
rates of importance aze modelled as functions of observed and unobserved
explanatory variables. Note that allowing for vaziation of observed and unob-
served explanatory variables is necessary in order to correct for a non-random
inflow into medical assistant jobs. If individuals for whom it is easy to become
junior medical specialist are aLso over-represented among medical assistanta
then a casual observer may conclude that there is a positive causal effect
even if in reality there is none.
As noted above, our framework resembles the model framework used in
some recent non-experimental studies on treatment effects for unemployed
workers. To date, there is not yet much experience with the empirical analysis
of treatment effects on duration vaziables, and our analysis contributes to this
recent literature (see Van den Berg, 1999, for a survey). Note that there is a
crucial difference in terminology between the treatment effect literature and
the present paper, as we consider the effect of work e.xperience for individuals
who actually aim at getting trnining (albeit in a job that goes along with
t.he training). Our study thus shows how to estimate a"treatment effect" of
work experience on the inflow into an advanced study program, using data
on durations spent in different states and transitions between these states.
The model, which is basically a mixture of semi-Markov processes, allows for
different "treatment effects" for different individuals.
One pazticular advarrtage of our data is that they do uot suffer from ini-
tial conditions problems. This enables consistent estimation of multi-state
duration models under relatively weak assumptions (compaze e.g. the com-
plications encountered by Ham and LaLonde, 1996, and Van den Berg, Lin-
deboom and Ridder, 1994). I'ïu~ther, for some respondents the data contain
rnultiple observations per spell type. This greatly facilitates the identifica-
tion and estimation of the joint distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity
vaziables entering the transition rates (see e.g. Honoré, 1993, and Van den
Berg, 1999).
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides some additional
information on the Dutch medical education system. Section 3 contains a
brief theoretical discussion of the search behavior of an individual in the
specific labor mazket we consider. Section 4 presents the data, and Section 5
discusses the econometric model specification we use in the empirical analysis.
5Tlus accounts for the possible endogeneity of the medical assistant job as an
intermediate st.age between undergraduate education and a junior medical
specialist. Section 6 contains the estimation results. Section 7 concludes.
2 Flows in the medical education system
As noted in the introduction, the Dutch medical education system consists of
two successive stages, and the inflow into the second stage is restricted by the
rationing of available slots. Basic doctors (i.e., those who have finished the
first stage) may go from the fust to the second stage by way of other labor
market states, like unemployment, or having a temporary job outside the
medical sector. Many basic doctors, however, work for a while as a medical
assistant and in the meantime search further for a junior medical assistant
job. Figure 1 shows three typical routes from the moment one becomes a
basic doctor to the moment one becomes a junior medical specialist. First,
a basic doctor may work as medical assistant until a job as junior medical
specialist is found. Second, a basic doctor may immediately start as a junior
medical specialist, without an intermediate medical assistant jobspell. Third,
a basic doctor can move from unemployment to a medical assistant job,
subsequently drop back into unemployment, and then finally enter a junior
medical specialist job.
About 90-95QIo of the basic doctors find a job within one year after fin-
ishing the first stage. So, at first sight, the labor market position of the basic
doctors may seem to be not so bad. Indeed, the unemployment rate among
all doctors (including basic doctors and medical specialists) was about óQlo
in the second half of t.he 1980s. However, the vast majority of the basic doc-
tors aim at becoming a medical specialist (recall that this term here includes
physicians), and the mere fact that a basic doctor is employed is not infor-
mative on whether he is a(junior) medical specialist. During the second half
of the 1980s, the annual outflow from the first stage of inedical education
was about 1500-1600. This number exceeds number of available positions in
the second stage of the education system. The annual inflow into medical
specialist jobs fluctuated around 1100 during that period (it decreased from
about 1200 in 1955 to about 1000 in 1990), and the average waiting time for
the latter type of jobs was quite long. The number of inedical assistant jobs
increased from about 500 in 1985 to about 800 in 1990.
There are basically three types of junior medical specialist jobs, each of
6them corresponding to a particular type of inedical specialist job. The first
type concerns physicians, with an annual inflow of 400 into the junior med-
ical specialist program. The second type concerns medical specialists proper
(surgeons, gynecologists, psychiatrists etc.; there aze about 30 different spe-
cialisms), with a total annual inflow of about 500. The third type concerns
"socio-medical doctors", which mainly work for insurance companies, with
an annual inflow of about 200.
3 Search for jobs in the medical sector
Like in unemployment duration models, the individual transition rates are
the focal points in our model. According to job seazch theory, the transi-
tion rate from unemployment to employment is the product of the rate at
which the individual receives job offers and the probability that such an of-
fer is acceptable to the individual (see e.g. Mortensen, 1986). The rate at
which job offers arrive depends on the intensity by which individuals and
employers search, on the matching technology, and on the probability that
an employer offers a job to the individual given that a contact is made. The
latter probability depends on the characteristics of the individual in compar-
ison to the job requirements. Individuals use a reservation wage strategy: if
the wage offer is equal to or larger than a specific reservation wage the offer
is accepted, whereas if the wage offer is lower than the reservation wage the
offer is rejected and the individual keeps on searching. The probability that
a job offer is acceptable equals the probability that the wage offer exceeds
the r~ervation wage. More generally, if a job is characterized not just by its
initial wage, then the individual compares the present utility value of the job
to the present value of searching further.
Now let us examine the seazch environment of t.he basic doctors searching
for junior medical specialist jobs and medical assistant jobs. The correspond-
ing labor market is actually quite transparent. First, there is a small flow
of vacancies that are being created, and their existence is probably common
knowledge upon creation. Second, there is no non-degenerate wage offer dis-
tribution, since the starting wage and the subsequent wages in both types of
positions are determined by nation-wide rules. It is therefore likely that every
job offer is acceptable for every searching individual. This is of course con-
ditional on the choice of the type of inedical specialization. Although wage
paths within a particular type of inedical specialization may not be very dif-
7ferent, there are large differences in the long-run wage paths across different
types of inedical specialization.
In our analysis, we are particulazly interested in three transition rates:
from unemployment to junior medical specialist, from unemployment to med-
ical assistant, and from medical assistant to junior medical specialist. Fl~om
the above we infer that these transition rates are mostly determined by the
search behavior and selection strategy of the employer. This means that if
there are differences in the hazard rate across basic doctors, then these reflect
employers' behavior and aggregate labor market conditions (like the number
of agents active on both sides of the market).
4 The data
The data were collected by the union of Dutch basic doctors (see Commissie
Werkgelegenheid LBB, 1992, for details) in March 1990. From three cohorts
of basic doctors (1984, 1986, and 1988), random samples of 500 each were
drawn from the register of inedical practitioners of the National Health In-
spection, These were subsequently surveyed by mail. The response rate is
about 75PIo. The net sample of 1088 observations is representative with re-
spect to gender (75oI'o men, 2501o women) and undergraduate university (there
are eight universities with a medical school: the two Amsterdam universities,
Groningen, Leiden, Maastricht, Nijmegen, Rotterdam, and Utrecht). The
data record personal and household characteristics, the respondent's educa-
tion and labor cnarket history (including transition dates), and subjective
responses about preferences.
Table 1 provides some summazy statistics of the duration data. Like in
the previous section, we dístinguish between three labor mazket states: un-
employment, medical assistant and junior medical specialist. The first two
states are transitory, whereas the third is an absorbing state. This yields four
different possible transitions: from unemployment to medical assistant, from
unemployment to junior medical specialist, from medical assistant to junior
medical specialist, and from medical assistant to unemployment. The state
of unemployment. is defined as a residual state that covers every situation
but medical assistant jobs and junior medical specialist jobs. Most impor-
tantly, it includes jobs outside the medical sector. As we shall see below, it is
computationally unfeasible to distinguish between different sub-states ofthis
residual state in the model. ALso, recall that our primary interest is in the
8transitions into junior medical specialist jobs. Jobs outside the medical sector
are most likely of minor relevance for the selection strategy of the employers
ofjunior medical specialist jobs.
On average, tlre data contain more than two spells per individual. The av-
erage duration for completed spells from unemployment into junior medical
specialist jobs is shorter than the average duration of spells from medical as-
sistant jobs to junior medical specialist jobs. However, note that the fraction
of inedical assistant job spells leading to a transition into a junior med-
ical specialist job is much higher than the fraction of unemployment spells
leading to such a transition. It may be interesting to note that, among the
respondents in a junior medical specialist job, only about 2001'o claimed that
they obtained the position because of the medical assistant job they had had
before.
Figure 2 depicts the estimated Kaplan-Meier hazard functions for the
four transition rates (the time unit is a month, and the function values are
blown up by a factor 100; note that these blown-up function values are ap-
proximately equal to monthly exit percentages). The transition rate from
unemployment to medical assistant (Figure 2a) sharply declines over the du-
ration of unemployment. Many individuals move to a medical assistant job
shortly after they become basic doctor. The small peak at 16-18 months can
be explained by the fact that military service is counted as unemployment.
Some individuals may have fu1611ed their military service right after the mo-
ment they become basic doctor, in which case they are only able to accept
assistant positions after about 16 months.2
Figure 2b displays the transition rate from unemployment to junior med-
ical specialist jobs. This rate is more or less constant, with the exception of
a shazp peak at 22 months. The remaining peaks are due to the fact that
the number of individuals in the risk set is very small. Although the peak at
22 months occurs somewhat later than the peak in Figure 2a, it may also be
due to militarv service.
The transition rate from medical assistant jobs to junior medical special-
2It can be argued that it is not correct to count military service as unemployment:
in general it is not possible to leave military service for e job before the service time is
completed, so the corresponding individuals have an unemploytnent exit rate of zero. To
investigate to what extent the results are sensitive to this, we re-estimated the model
under the alternative assumption that military service does not add to the unemployment
duration. It turns out that there is no substantial e4fect on the conclusions. It should be
noted that military service was only compulsory for a subset of male basic doctors.
9ist jobs is slightly increasing in the elapsed duration of the job, with peaks
around 12 and 24 months (see Figure 2c). These peaks may reflect the fact
that medical assistant jolks often have contracts with a fixed duration. This is
an interesting feature of t.he medical assistant jobs. Even if a job as medical
assistant is beneficial for one's chances of getting an offer of a job as junior
medical specialist, the observed transition rate into the latter jobs may be
low for some medical assistants who just stazted in their job, because of this
"locking in" property. By compazing Figures 2b and 2c we observe that the
t.ransition rate from medical assistant to junior medical specialist is higher
than the rate from unemployment to junior medical specialist, for most du-
rations. This suggests that being a medical assistant does help to become
junior medical specialist. However, this compazison does not take account of
the selectivity discussed in Section 1.
The transition rate from medical assistant jobs back into unemployment
(Figure 2d) has peaks at the same points as the transition rate in Figure 2c,
with additional peaks at 3 and 6 months. This probably also reflects the fixed
duration of the contracts if some medical assistant jobs. Over all, except for
the peaks, the transition rate in Figure 2d seems constant. We now turn to
a formal statistical analysis of the data.
5 The model specification
5.1 The transition rates
Let the indices 1, 2, and 3 denote the states of "unemployment", "medical
assistant", and "junior medical specialist". The transition rate from state i
to state j is denoted by B;j. Consider a spell in state i. The survivor function
for survival in state i can be expressed as
j-3 ~
S;(t) - exp -~ f B;j(s)dsl , i- 1,2
o J i-1,i~~
We define the censoring indicator d;j to equal 1 if a transition into state j
is made, with d,j - 0 otherwise. Suppose we observe ~m; spelLs in state i,
for some individual. We extend the definition of d;j by introducing a third
index k denoting the spell at hand. The log likelihood contribution for this
individual can then be expressed as
10[2 ~ ~m;` j-3
L L
log `Si(tk) } ~ dijk 1ogBij(tk)
i-1 k-1 j-1,j~i
Note that if d;jk - 0 for all permissible combinations of ti and j then the
corresponding duration is right-censored. The only unknowns in this model
are the B;j functions. Note that the likelihood is separable in the B;j, so that
they can be estimated separately (see e.g. Lancaster, 1990). Below we extend
this model framework by introducing observed and unobserved explanatory
variables.
First, we allow the individual transition rates to depend on observed
explanatory variables, as follows,
Bii(tl ~) - ~ii(t) ~P(F~ijxij)
where a;j is a baseline hazard, Q;j is a vector of state and exit specific pa-
rameters, and x;j contains some (possibly) state and exit specific regressors.
Note that this defines a proportional hazard model framework for each B;j,
and the likelihood function is still separable.
We iliclude the following explanatory variables in x, for each transitíon
rate. First, we Itave two dununy variables representing cohorts that became
basic doctor in in 1986 ("Graduate~") and 1988 ("Graduate~"), so that
the third cohort of 1984 is the reference group. Second, we include age and
gender. The v~ariable "Age" measures the age at the start of the spell, so it
is constant within spells but not across spells for a given individual. Third,
we include the duration of the tmdergraduate study. Finally, in a prelirninary
analysis we investigated whether the university at which the undergraduate
study was carried out is an important explanatory variable in the model.
With the exception of Utrecht, this was never the case. Therefore, we use
one additional dummy variable for Utrecht. Table 2 provides some sample
statistics for the explanatory variables.
The inclusion of unobserved heterogeneity allows for meastirement errors
in t.he dependent variable as well as omitted unobserved covariates; see Lan-
caster (1990). Here we propose a mixed proportional hazard model for each
transition rate, by introducing multiplicative random effects v;j that arestate
and exit specific,
Bii (t l x, t~ii )-~ij (t) eXP(Qijx{j )v;j.
11For a given individual, the values of v;i aze assumed to be identical across
different spells in state i.The survivor function for survival in state i, given
x and given v-(7112, 1113r 7~21e ~~23), can be expressed as
i-3 ~
s;(t~x, v) - exp -~ f B;j(s~a, zi.i)ds~ , i- 1, 2
i-1,i~~ o
To deal with selective inflow into the states "medical assistant" and "ju-
nior medical specialist" , we allow the v;i variables to be related for a given
individual. For example, the observed transition rate from "medical assistan-
t" to "junior medical specialist" may be higher than the observed rate from
"unemployment" to "junior medical specialist" just because individuals for
which it is easy to become junior medical specialist tend to self-select into
medical assistant jobs (for example, v12 is positively related to vi3 which in
turn equals v23).
Since v is unobserved, it must be integrated out of the conditional likeli-
hood. The marginal individual likelihood contribution (given x) equals
2 m; j-3
log f ~ ~ S;(tk) ~ [9;j(ik)]d''k dF(v)
v .-i k-i i, ; i- i;E
where F is t.he cumulative distribution function of v in the inflow into the
population of basic doctors. In general, the likelihood function is not separa-
ble anymore in the parameters of the different transition rates.
5.2 Functional forms
For the durat.ion dependence functions .~;i(t) and the multivariate unobserved
heterogeneity distribution F(v) we take the most flexible specifications used
in the literature to date. We take ~;j(t) to have piecewise constant speci-
fications. Let the positive time axis be subdivided into a fuvte number of
intervals numbered 1, 2, ... from the origin onwards. The piecewise constant
specification can then be written as
~ij(t) - [~ ~ijTIT(t)
where t denot.es the elapsed duration, the subscript r refers to consecutive
duration intervals, the functions I, (t) are time-varying dummy variables that
12aze equal to 1 iff t is in interval r, and a;~r are the parameters to be esti-
mated. Note that witlr an increasing number of time intervals any duration
deperrdence pattern can be apprwcimated azbitrazily closely. By now it is
well known that duration dependence specifications with only one pazameter
(like a Weibull specification) aze overly restrictive (see e.g. Lancaster, 1990).
In the empirical analysis we adopt the following intervals T: 0-1, 1-2, 2-4,
4-12, and 12f, where the rnonth is the time unit.
We take the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity terms 1, to be
discrete with a finite number ofmass points, and we take both the locations of
the mass points and the associated probabilities to be unknown parameters.
Let p„ with n- 1, 2, ..., N denote probabilities that add to 1, and let v;~„
denote a realization of the random variable v;~. We assume that
Pr(1~;~ - v;~„) - p„ for all ij E{ 12,13, 21, 23}
and 11;~ - 17;~n q 11;.~. - T);.~.n for all ij,i'j` E {12,13,21,23}
This family of distributions is special case ofthe general multivaziate discrete
distribution for (vr2, v13, v21, v~). The latter has N possible realizations of
each v;~, while every combination of realizations of v;~ and v;.~. is allowed, so
that the vector v has N4 possible realizations. This amounts to N4 ~ 4N - 1
unknown pazaaneters, which is unfeasible even for N- 2. In contrast, our
specification has only 4N f 3 unknown parameters. It restricts the general
nrultivariate distribution by imposing a deterministic relation between the
elements of (1112r1J13,T~21~2143). Note that the latter relation is not imposed
to be monot.one. In the empirical analysis, we seazch for the smallest value
of N that gives the highest value of the likelihood function, and we report
st.andard errors for the other parameters conditional on this value of N.
For given N, the total number of unknown parameters equals the sum of:
(a) the number of elements of fj;~ (six) times the number of tij-combinations
(four), (b) the number of pazameters ~;~r (five) times the number of ij-
combinations (four), and (c) 4N f 3 parameters of the specification of F(v),
minus four normalizations. This sum equals 4N -}- 47. Cleazly, if we would di-
vide the state of unemployment into a number of sub-states then the number
of pazameters would become too large for estimation.
In the above model, the effect of a medical assistant job on the individual
transition rate into a junior medical specialist job follows from a comparison
of B23(t~x, v23) and B13(t~x, vla). If the baseline hazards a;~(t) are constant
13then these transition rates are constant over time, and their ratio defines the
change in the rate into junior medical specialist jobs that is due to having a
medical assistant job, for an individual with a given a and v. Non-constant
baseline hazards take account of the way in which this effect changes over the
durations of the medical assistant job and unemployment, respectively. The
fact that we allow for ,Q13 ~~z3 and that we allow for z,13~vza to be different
across individuals means that we allow the individual effect of a medical
assistant job to differ between individuals. The average effect is obtained by
averaging the individual effect over x, i,. As noted above, the extent to which
vlz is related to v13 and v23 determines the extent to wluch selectivity affects
the relation in the raw data between having a medical assistant job or not
and the rate of entering a junior medical specialist job.
The model of this section implies that (properties of) the distribution
of the the observed durations are quite complicated non-linear functions of
the parameters. Some caution on identification therefore seems appropriate.
By Heckman and Honoré (1989), the parameters of a flexible competing
risks model with mixed proportional hazards are identified under weak con-
ditions. The model implies competing risks specifications for the exits out
of unemployment as well as for the exits out of inedical assistant jobs. The
distribution of v in the inflow into medical assistant jobs is determined by
the distribution of v in the outflow out of unemployment. Note that in both
cases we ohserve more than in a competing risks model, as the observation
window only ends upon a transition into the state of junior medical special-
ist jobs (or bc~cause of right-censoring). Moreover, we may observe multiple
spells in the states of unemployment and medical assistant jobs. Some con-
fidence on identification seems therefore justified. Also, we have estimated
the model with restrictions on the parameters determining the exit rate from
medical assistant and into a junior medical specialist position, namely that
Qza - Aia and ~'za -~'is. This makes the model identical to that of Heclanan
and Honoré (1989), for which identification is obtained. The model presented
in this paper is significantly different from the model with restrictions on the
parameters for the exit rate from medical assistant and into a junior medical
specialist position. However they lead qualitatively and also quantitatively
the the same conclusions on the effect of being in a medical assistant posi-
tions, as compared to being unemployed, on the entry rate into junior medical
specialist positions. A formal proof of nonparametric identification along the
lines of Heclanan and Honoré (1989) is beyond the scope of this paper.
14One could argue that the B;~ transition rates should be allowed to depend
on the elapsed time since the moment the individual became basic doctor, or
on whether the individual has ever been medical assistant, or on other lagged
endogenous v~ariables. However, this demands even more of the data in terms
of (nonparametric) identification. We experimented with the estimation of
such general specifications, but it turned out to be impossible to obtain con-
vergence of the estimation procedure to reasonable parameter values. We also
experimented with alternative specifications that do not nest the model of
this section (e.g. by allowing the transition rate into junior medical specialist
jobs to depend on whether the individual has ever been medical assistant,
but not on any other feat.ure of the current or past labor mazket state). It
turns out. that. the estimate of the effect of having a medical assistant job on
the rate into junior medical specialist jobs is robust with respect to this.
6 Estimation results
The pazameter ~timates are presented in Tables 3ar3c. Table 3a shows the
paranreter estimates of the covariate effects, Table 3b shows the estimates of
the baseline hazards, and Table 3c shows the estimates of the parameters of
the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity.
In Table 3a we show estimates for the main model as well as for a simpler
model that does not account for unobserved heterogeneity. F~om the table
we infer that. the model allowing for correlated unobserved heterogeneity in
the exit ratc~ yields a con5iderably lrigher likelihood than the model without
heterogeneity. Hence inference on the effects of the covariates and having an
assist.ant position should be based on the model allowing for heterogeneity.
Note that some of the estimated covariate effects differ substantially between
the two model specifications.~
We first examine the transition rate from unemployment into medical
~We also estimated a model with uncorrelated unobserved heterogeneity ín all four
transition rates. For the exit rates out of unemployment, this model yields quite similar
estimates as the model allowing for correlated unobserved heterogeneity, whereas for the
exit rates out of inedical assist.ant jobs there is no evidence of heterogeneíty in this model.
At first sight this may be interpreted as evidence that allowing for unobserved heterogene-
ity per se is more important than allowing for dependence of the unobserved heterogeneity
terms. However, such an interpretation is invalid, es the models with correlated and un-
correlated heterogeneity are not nested.
15assistant jo6.5. As we shall see below, such a position increases the chances
of obtaining a junior medical specialist job. None of the cohort effects (the
"Graduate" parameters) is significant. "Age" is very significant and negative,
so this type of transition is more likely to be made by younger basic doctors.
Finally, we note that there is a significant gender but no significant university
effect. Conditional on other characteristics females are more likely to make
a transition into a medical assistant job.
Next we look at the transition frorn unemployment to junior medical spe-
cialist jobs. Here we note that "Graduatesfi" and "Graduats88" are significant
and negative. This indicates that junior medical specialist jobs are harder to
obtain for unemployed in the latter cohorts than for unemployed in the first
cohort. This is probably because of the reduction in tlre number of junior
medical specialist jobs in the second half of the 1980s, but it could also be
caused by crowding out of unemployed basic doctors by medical assistants.
More and more basic doctors are searching for junior medical specialist posi-
tions from medical assistant jobs, leaving less chances for unemployed basic
doctors, if ernployers prefer the former over the latter. All the other coeffi-
cients are insignificant in this transition.
The transitiou rate from medical assistantjobs tojunior medical specialist
jobs is also lower for later cohorts (the coefficients of both "Graduatese" and
"Graduate~" are negative and significant). This cohort difference is, however,
of smaller size than the corresponding difference among the unemployed ba-
sic doctors, so medical assistants suffer less from the increased shortage of
junior medical specialist jobs than otherwise comparable unemployed basic
doct.ors. Of the other coefficients only those of age and gender are signifi-
cant. Conditional on the other chazacteristics older medical assistants have
a smaller t.ransition rate to junior medical specialists, while for females this
transition rate is lazger.
For the transition from medical assistant to unemployment, apart from
a small cohort effect. only the variable "Studytime" is significant at a 10
01o significance level. It is negative, indicating that individuaLs with a high
undergraduate study time are less likely to leave medical assistant jobs for
unemployment.
All in all, the estimation results in Table 3a indicate that cohort, age
and gender are important. determinants of the process by which basic doc-
tors find a job as junior medical specialist. Individuals in latsr cohorts find
it more difficult t.o become junior medical specialist, since both the direct
16transition rate from unernployment and the ind'uect transition rate via a job
as a medical assistant are smaller than they aze for eazlier cohorts.
We proccxd to analyze t.he level and slope of the baseline hazazds and
the size of the mean "treatment effect" of having a medical assistant job on
the transition rate into junior medical specialist jobs. The estimated baseline
hazard coefficients aze given in Table 3b (the table lists the estimates of
log aijr). Figure 3 depicts the transition rates of interest, as functions of the
elapsed duration, for a person with average sample statistics and average
estimated 1,.a The figure shows a dramatic difference between the over-all
levels of two transition rates, indicating the difference in the possibilities
of finding a junior medical specialist job from an assistant position vis-à-
vis from tmemployment. We return to the magnitude of this difference after
having discussed the baseline hazard estimates. The transition rate from a
medical assistant job into junior medical specialist jobs is initially virtually
zero. This probably reflects some "locking in effect" from minimum contract
durations of inedical assistant jobs. Also not.e that this transition rate declines
after 12 moriths of search. There is a similaz sharp decline in the transition
rate from unemployment to junior medical specialist jobs. Nevertheless, the
fact that the rate from a medical assistant job to junior medical specialist
jobs diminishes over the duration of the medical assistant job indicates that
accuinulation of hurnan capital is not a major reason for employers to prefer
individuals who are medical assistant. For the same reason, work experience
as medical sssistant is not expected to have a major effect on the size of
t.he social network that may be used to obtain a junior medical specialist
job. Appazently, the fact. that t.he individual has a medical assistant job acts
primarily as a(positive) signal for employers. The fact that the transition
rate decreasc~ may be due to a stigma effect of a high length of time since the
rnoment the individual became basic doctor, as hypothesized in section 1. In
addition, the individual may regazd a job as a junior medical specialist as an
investment, and the shorter the pay-back time of this investment, the lower
the willingness to make it.. Note that this may also explain the estimated
"Age" effects above.
Table 4 displays the size of the mean effect of having a medical assistant
job from another angle. It gives the simulated fraction of individuals who
have obtained a junior medical specialist job, from a medical assistant job
~If background variables are set to other values then the levels of the transition rates
change.
17and from unemployment, respectively, as functions of the elapsed durations
since inflow into the corresponding state. These calculations are based on
average values of the background characteristics. The results in this table
confirm that inítially the transition rate from medical assistant jobs to junior
medical specialist jobs is low. However, after 12 months the proportion of
medical assistants who have entered a junior medical specialist job is twice
as large as the proportion of unemployed who have entered such a job.
Table 3c gives the estimates for the unobserved heterogeneity distribution
(it lists the estimates of log v;~„ and p„). This distribution has three points
of support, so one could imagine three groups of homogeneous basic doctors.
A small group of about 201'o has very unfavorable prospects in the medical
education system. They have a relatively low exit rate from unemployment
both to medical assistant jobs and to junior medical specialist jobs. More-
over, once an individual in this group has a medical assistant job, he has
a relatively low transition rate to a junior medical specialist position and a
relatively high transition rate back to unemployment. A group of about 18P1o
has the best prospects for becoming junior medical specialist. They have rel-
atively high transition rates from unemployment to medical assistant jobs
and junior medical specialist jobs. Moreover, their transition rate to a ju-
nior medical specialist position is relat.ively high and their transition rate
baclc to unemployment is relatively low. The remaining group of SOo1o has an
intermediate position in terms of the magnitude of all the transition rates.
7 Conclusions
The main einpirical result of this study is that it is beneficial for individuals
to accept a job as a medical assistant in order to become junior medical spe-
cialist. Having ajob as medical assistant substantially increases the transition
rate to junior medical specialist jobs. The results are corrected for possible
selectivity effects by taking account of unobserved heterogeneity in the indi-
vidual transition rates. Without this correction we would have estimated a
smaller "treatment" effect.
From the estimated duration dependence pattern of the transition rate
from medical assistant jobs to junior medical specialist jobs we infer that the
former type of job does not provide much human capital that could serve
as input for the latter type of job. The treatment effect can therefore not
be attributed to accumulation of human capital. 5imilarly, being a medical
18assistant docs not have a major effect on the size of the social network that
may be used to obtain a junior medical specialist job. Appazently, the fact
that the individual has a medical assistant job acts primarily as a positive
signal for ernployers. It indicates that candidates are suitable for and~or
interested in a medical career.
The results indicate that there aze strong cohort effects. For individuals in
later cohorts it is more difficult to find a job as junior medical specialist. Both
the direct transition rate from unemployment and the indirect transition tate
via a job as a medical assistant are smaller than they are for earlier cohorts.
This may be due to crowding out of unemployed basic doctors by medical
assistants, which may be enhanced by the reduction in the number ofjunior
medical specialist jobs in the second half of the 1980s.
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21Table 1. Summary statistics on durations.
~ of persons 1088
~ of spells 1869
av. duration of 1-2 transitions 6.0
av. duration of 1-3 transitions 13.7
av. duration of 1-? transitions 13.2
~ of 1-2 transitions 682
~ of 1- 3 transitions 128
~ of 1-"? transitions 1228
av. duration of 2-3 transitions 17.4
av. duration of 2-1 transitions 13.6
av. duration of 2-? transitions 18.6
~ of 2-3 transitions 199
~ of 2-1 transitions 123
~ of 2-? transitions 641
~ of censored spells 737
Note: states 1, 2, and 3 are unemployment, medical assistant, and junior
medical specialist, respectively. A question mark denot.es right-censoring.
Table 2. Summary statistics on explanatory variables.
Variable De,scription Average
Graduate~ 1 if graduated in 1984, 0 otherwise. 0.34
Graduate86 1 if graduated in 1986, 0 otherwise. 0.32
Graduate88 1 if graduated in 1988, 0 otherwise. 0.34
Age age in montl~s~120 at the outset of the spell. 2.85'
Studytime duration (months~120) spent at university before basic doctor. 0.81
Gender 1 if female, 0 otherwise. 0.34
Utrecht 1 if graduated at University of Utrecht, 0 otherwise. 0.15
~ The value of this vaziable thus varies across spells.
22Table 3a. Fstimation results for covariate effects.
No heterogeneity With heterogeneity
Variable estimate std. error estimate std. error
Unemployment to medical assistant
Graduate86 0.313 0.404 0.245 0.484
Graduatese 0.464 0.201~`~ 0.395 0.231
Studytime -0.017 0.052 -0.019 0.046
Age -0.301 0.073~" -0.300 0.075~`~`
Utrecht 0.220 0.434 0.197 0.256
Gender 0.233 0.079~`~` 0.250 0.096~`~`
Unemployment to junior medical specialist
Graduate8ó -0.580 0.228~~` -0.525 0.266'~`
Graduate8s -1.160 0.421~`~` -1.034 0.524~`~`
Studytime -0.050 0.083 -0.044 0.087
Age 0.055 0.064 0.055 0.076
Utrecht -0.214 0.124~` 0.188 0.145
Gender -0.123 0.267 0.075 0.231
Medical assistant to junior medical specialist
Graduateafi -0.236 0.119~`~` -0.247 0.146~
Graduate88 -0.961 0.411~~` -0.926 0.432~`~`
Studytime 0.007 0.041 0.007 0.042
Age -0.737 0.252~~` -0.750 0.281~"
Utrecht 0.093 0.041`~` 0.058 0.041
Gender 0.236 0.122~` 0.244 0.142'
Medical assistant to unemployment
Graduate8ó -0.071 0.240 -0.239 0.225
Graduate88 0.027 0.041 -0.190 0.085~`~`
Studyt.ime -0.021 0.011~~ -0.014 0.008~
Age -0.151 0.116 0.146 0.124
Utreclit -0.146 0.215 -0.156 0.256
Gender -0.421 0.232~` -0.502 0.276
Log L 5055.1 5023.3
Note: ~ indicates two-sided significance at a 10 0l0 level.
~~` indicates two-sided significance at a 5 070 level.
23Table 3b. Estimation results for baseline hazard.
No heterogeneity With heterogeneity
Estimate std. error Estimate std. error
Unemployment to medical assistant
0-1 month 0.078 0.058 0.240 0.075
1-2 months -1.677 0.114 -1.533 0.123
2-4 months -2.335 0.167 -2.172 0.172
4-12 months -2.977 0.139 -2.813 0.143
12f months -4.417 0.316 -4.267 0.319
Unemployment to junior medical specialist
0-1 month -3.212 0.267 -3.123 0.416
1-2 months -3.264 0.378 -3.103 0.455
2-4 months -3.709 0.378 -3.567 0.457
4-12 months -3.574 0.267 -3.373 0.327
12f months -4.606 0.278 -4.111 0.261
Medical assistant to junior medical specialist
0-1 month -5.274 0.448 -5.267 0.464
1-2 months -4.612 0.265 -4.236 0.188
2-4 months -3.743 0.180 -3.591 0.216
4-12 months -2.922 0.177 -2.651 0.154
12- months -3.772 0.213 -3.469 0.230
Medical assistant to unemployment
0-1 month -0.838 0.228 -0.863 0.288
1-2 months -3.730 0.120 -4.090 0.305
2-4 months -3.415 0.218 -3.879 0.266
4-12 months -3.490 0.267 -3.879 0.324
12-} months -4.630 0.277 -5.081 0.288
Note: Estimates shown are for log a;~r.
24Table 3c. Fstimation results for unobserved hetero~eneity distribution.
Mass point n Fstimate log t~;~„ std. error




















25Table 4. Simulated duration distributions for
an average individual.
Unemployment to medical assistant
Proportion of spells ended after:
1 month 2.0 Plo
2 months 3.9 Plo
4 months 6.4 010
12 months 17.3 PIo
MediCal assistant to junior medical specialist
Proportion of spells ended after:
1 month 0.3 PIo
2 months 1.3 Qlo
4 months 4.9 ~o
12 months 35.1 Plo
Note: The simulated probabilities are calculated for
an average person in t.he data set.
26Figure 1. Typical job histories.
Unemploymentetc. Junior Medical Specialist
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